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Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance:  When Public Opinion 
Determines Constitutional Law 
By 
Nathaniel Persily* & Kelli Lammie**
 
 
This study tests the empirical assumptions about American public opinion 
found in the Supreme Court’s opinions concerning campaign finance 
reform.  The area of campaign finance is a unique one in First Amendment 
law because the Court has allowed the mere perception of a problem (in 
this case, “corruption”) to justify the curtailment of recognized First 
Amendment rights of speech and association.  Since Buckley v. Valeo, 
defendants in campaign finance cases have proffered various types of 
evidence to support the notion that the public perceives a great deal of 
corruption produced by the campaign finance system. Most recently, in 
McConnell v. FEC, in which the Court upheld the McCain-Feingold 
campaign finance law, both the Department of Justice and the plaintiffs 
conducted and submitted into evidence public opinion polls measuring the 
public’s perception of corruption.  This article examines the data 
presented in that case, but also examines forty years of survey data of 
public attitudes toward corruption in government.  We argue that trends in 
public perception of corruption have little to do with the campaign finance 
system.  The share of the population describing government as corrupt 
went down even as soft money contributions skyrocketed.  Moreover, the 
survey data suggest that an individual’s perception of corruption derives 
from that person’s (1) position in society (race, income, education level); 
(2) opinion of the incumbent President and performance of the economy 
over the previous year; (3) attitudes concerning taxation and “big 
government”; and (4) propensity to trust other people, in general.   
Although we conclude that, indeed, a large majority of Americans believe 
that the campaign finance system contributes to corruption in government, 
the data do not suggest that campaign finance reform will have an effect 
on these attitudes. 
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When government lawyers make arguments seeking to justify a state’s 
infringement of a constitutional right, they tend not to say something like “most people 
think a problem exists, so the state has a compelling interest in allaying their fears.”  Yet 
in the context of campaign finance, government lawyers not only make such an 
argument, but such reasoning and evidence have become almost mandatory as courts 
have struggled to follow the line of cases from Buckley v. Valeo1 to McConnell v. FEC.2  
Among the unique exceptions to general First Amendment law made in the context of 
campaign finance regulation, those cases have established that the mere appearance of a 
problem (in this case, “corruption”) is sufficient to justify infringements on recognized 
First Amendment rights (in this case, the rights of association and expression).  Most 
recently, to support this argument, lawyers have offered and judges have accepted public 
opinion polls demonstrating that Americans perceive a great deal of corruption arising 
from large contributions to candidates and political parties or from certain types of 
expenditures on their behalf.  To date, very little has been written on public perception of 
corruption, in general, or on the data that link such perceptions to problems in the 
campaign finance system.3  This Article attempts to do both. 
 
                                                          
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
2 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
3 The one exception is the work of David Primo.  See David Primo, Campaign Finance and Public 
Opinion, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC OPINION (forthcoming 2004); David Primo, Campaign 
Contributions, the Appearance of Corruption, and Trust in Government, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS, 285-296 (Anthony Corrado et al., eds., 2003); David 
Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality, 7 THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
207-219 (Fall 2002); David Primo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 
BUSINESS AND POLITICS 75 (April 2000). 
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 We begin in Part I by briefly sketching the evolution of the appearance-of-
corruption rationale for campaign finance regulation.  We argue that the Court’s startling 
invocation of this novel state interest has less to do with the importance of removing 
unsavory appearances and more to do with the difficulty of proving actual corruption.  
Reliance on combating the appearance or perception of impropriety serves as a fall-back 
state interest in the likely event that one cannot make the difficult showing that campaign 
contributions have actually influenced a representative’s vote on a bill or other change in 
official behavior.  
In Part II we present data used in McConnell v. FEC to make the strongest 
argument in favor of the notion that the public perceives a great deal of corruption arising 
from campaign contributions.  Although we are critical of the way public opinion polls 
have been deployed in that case among others, we admit the obvious:  that the American 
public believes that contributors exert undue influence over the decisions of members of 
Congress.  We should even concede up front that we too believe that representatives have 
been influenced by campaign contributions: that money buys access and in some cases, 
may buy votes. 
In Part III, we present data not previously employed in campaign finance 
litigation.  We attempt to demonstrate that aggregate perceptions of corruption have little 
to do with anything happening in the campaign finance regime and more to do with 
Americans’ opinions about government generally, incumbent officeholders, and the state 
of the economy, in particular.  We also splice the public opinion data according to several 
different demographic and political variables to get a sense of which subsections of the 
American population are more likely to perceive corruption and why.  In general, those 
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with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to perceive corruption.  Moreover, 
general anti-government feelings, specific anti-incumbent attitudes and opinion as to the 
performance of the economy also seem to contribute strongly to feelings about corruption 
in government.  Finally, for some individuals, belief that government is corrupt is a 
natural outgrowth of their psychological predisposition to mistrust people, in general.  
Cynics believe people are selfish and corrupt, so it should come as no surprise that they 
feel government is corrupt as well. 
In Part IV we present our conclusions.  As we note there, this Article has a little 
something for everyone in the campaign finance debate.  For defenders of recent reforms, 
we validate their gut reaction that the public sees large campaign contributions as unduly 
influencing the official behavior of members of Congress.  Indeed, such perceptions of 
corruption extend not only to givers of the large contributions banned by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act and earlier reforms but also to contributions made within the 
laws’ limits.  It seems a fair inference to us that Americans perceive campaign 
contributions of almost any size as leading to undue influence of the contributor over the 
recipient.  Opponents of the reforms might find solace in that latter finding and in the 
finding that trends in general attitudes of corruption seem unrelated to anything 
happening in the campaign finance system (i.e., a rise in contributions or the introduction 
of a particular reform).  For those disinterested in campaign finance, we analyze survey 
data concerning public perceptions of government corruption more generally.  We try to 
explain which subsets of the population perceive the government as crooked or unduly 
influenced, as well as how and why such perceptions have changed over time.  In the end, 
we discourage the use of any such data in litigation:  If courts continue to hold that 
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campaign finance is one of those areas of the law where, in effect, “appearances do 
matter,”4 we hope judges will not base their decisions on a headcount of the American 
people. 
 
I. The Unique Place of Public Opinion in Campaign Finance Law 
It is worth noting at the outset the extraordinary nature of the state’s interest in 
preventing appearances of corruption in the context of First Amendment law.5  In 
general, when core First Amendment rights of political speech and association are at 
stake, courts apply strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest and means that are 
narrowly tailored to address that interest.  Catering to irrational fears never constitutes a 
compelling state interest.  In fact, irrational fear is often listed as one of the few bases 
insufficient to justify laws to which courts apply the lowest level of scrutiny: aptly termed 
rational basis review.6   
In general, the state has a compelling interest only in addressing problems that are 
both real and significant.  “When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a 
means to . . . prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply ‘posit the existence 
of the disease sought to be cured.’ . . . It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, 
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct 
and material way.”7   Government cannot squelch speech, let alone political speech, 
                                                          
4 Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (ruling that bizarrely shaped congressional districts may 
trigger strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
5 For a more developed exploration of this argument from which much written here is drawn, see D. Bruce 
La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears About “Big Money” & Protecting 
Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687 (2000). 
6 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
7 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.)) (internal citation omitted).  
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based upon a guess as to the speech’s bad consequences.  This is not to say that the 
obvious needs to be proven:  People need not be trampled before the government outlaws 
the shouting of “Fire!” in a crowded (non-burning) theater.  However, when the scale and 
nature of the harm is non-obvious, evidence as to its existence is usually a necessary 
predicate to regulation of constitutional rights. 
As the caselaw discussed in this Part illustrates, campaign finance is one area in 
constitutional law where reality and appearances stand on an equal footing.  The 
prevention of actual or apparent corruption exists as a compelling state interest, indeed 
the only state interests, which can justify regulation of campaign contributions or, with 
respect to corporate and union treasury money, even independent campaign expenditures.  
In the first two subparts, we provide the Court’s rationale for this exception to the general 
rule of reality in First Amendment law.  In the third subpart we attempt to provide what 
we think are more powerful reasons for making appearances matter in campaign finance. 
 
A. Buckley v. Valeo’s8 Emphasis on Appearances 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that a compelling interest in 
preventing actual and apparent corruption underlay Congress’s passage of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.  The Court found these interests to be 
significant enough to justify curtailing the rights of expression and association implicated 
in restrictions on the amount of money a contributor could give to a candidate.9  Unlike 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The Court specifically rejected the application of this standard for the campaign finance context in Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
8 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
9 Buckley accorded a lower level of scrutiny to campaign contributions than to campaign expenditures.  The 
former were seen as less protected because they implicated association more than speech.  To the degree 
contributions were speech they were largely speech by proxy and the expression entailed in the mere giving 
of a contribution was not magnified by the amount of the contribution.  Limits on individuals’ 
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restrictions on individual expenditures, which implicate core political speech and 
therefore trigger strict scrutiny, contribution restrictions are subject to less-than-strict 
scrutiny (sometimes called “Buckley scrutiny”10).  For purposes of this Article, however, 
the significant aspect of the scrutiny the Court brings to bear on campaign contribution 
restrictions is the need for the state to justify such laws based on their prevention of 
actual corruption or the appearance of corruption.   
 Although a precise definition of corruption may be elusive, few would doubt the 
state’s interest in combating or preventing corruption.   The debate is joined when 
campaign contributions are analogized to bribes.   As the Buckley Court drew the 
connection, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure political quid pro 
quo’s from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of 
representative democracy is undermined.”11  Corruption by way of campaign 
contributions is tantamount to corruption by way of payoffs for the recipient’s personal 
gain.  In each case the donor acquires undue influence merely because of the money that 
changes hands and inures to the candidate’s benefit.  True, in the case of bribery the 
money is for the governing official’s personal benefit, while campaign contributions can 
only be used for activities relating to the pursuit of office.  Nevertheless, the problem 
such regulations address is the same:  to prevent the economically powerful from using 
their financial position to buy political favors. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
expenditures, on the other hand, restrict core political speech and therefore cannot be limited. Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 51-59. 
10 Specifically, such scrutiny translates into the following: “Burdens on contributions may only be sustained 
if the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest [namely, preventing corruption or its appearance] 
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 25. 
11 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
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 The state’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption, therefore, arises 
from the desire to create a system in which quid pro quos do not appear to be taking place 
or big donors do not appear to have undue influence.12  In the Buckley Court’s words: “of 
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of 
the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for 
abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”13  Thus, the state 
has an interest in avoiding these ugly appearances because “public awareness” of the 
mere opportunity for influence could erode public trust in representatives and 
representative institutions. “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of 
the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . .  if confidence in the system of 
representative [g]overnment is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”14
 The state has an interest in combating the appearance of corruption, then, not 
because such appearances are inherently bad, but because such appearances result in 
second-order effects: public cynicism, alienation, lack of trust and lack of confidence in 
government.  If government seems to be for sale to the highest bidder, the argument goes, 
the American people become disenchanted with politics, lose faith in their democracy 
and believe that their votes do not make a difference.  The government loses legitimacy, 
under this view, when the public perceives campaign contributions as having a greater 
effect than do constituent preferences or conscience on a representative’s behavior. 
 
B. Proving the Appearance of Corruption from Buckley to McConnell 
                                                          
12 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (summarizing the state’s 
interest in combating corruption as extending to “undue influence” and “the broader threat from politicians 
too compliant with the wishes of large contributors”). 
13 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. 
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From the time Buckley laid down this unique state interest grounded on combating 
appearances, courts have found various ways of demonstrating that such appearances 
exist.  On its face, the appearance of corruption standard does not necessarily require 
sophisticated empirical studies of any sort, let alone public opinion polls.  Either 
contributions or expenditures at a given amount appear to corrupt (that is, appear to give 
the contributor or spender too much influence) or they do not.  One might be able to 
answer the question in the abstract even without a factual showing in the traditional 
sense:  Does a person who gives X dollars to a candidate or party, for example, appear to 
gain undue influence as a result of the contribution?  In any event, courts have relied on 
the following categories of evidence to demonstrate that such appearances exist: 
newspaper accounts, testimony from politicians, experts and other witnesses, referendum 
results, and public opinion polls. 
Such evidence can support an inference of an appearance of corruption in several 
ways.  If such evidence demonstrates actual corruption, then it ineluctably demonstrates 
an appearance of corruption.  In other words, if the judge can discern from the evidence 
presented that an actual quid pro quo took place, then by definition the contribution 
appears to corrupt as well.  Second, these different forms of evidence may offer opinions 
as to what an individual perceives.   Defendants will offer evidence that amounts to a 
declaration that “the system appears corrupt to me” – where the “me” could be an expert, 
politician, poll respondent, or editorial board, who feel that certain practices amount to 
corruption.  Finally, such evidence could consist of opinions as to what others think.  For 
example, a pollster or other expert might attest to the public’s view that certain practices 
appear corrupt or a newspaper editorial could suggest that the public believes a certain 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
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politician is corrupt.  Such evidence amounts to a witness’s declaration that, whatever the 
truth of the matter, it appears to some people that something fishy is going on.   
Newspaper stories and editorials provide a rich source of evidence of appearance 
of corruption.15  Defendants will submit news clippings that report on campaign finance 
incidents and seeming abuses, as well as opinion pieces that attest to the appearance of 
corruption in the current system.  The evidence submitted and accepted by the court in 
Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, which upheld a Maine 
law limiting contributions, is both typical and typically vacuous: 
“Ranking lawmakers and their committees pulled in close 
to $400,000 in big gifts from special interests, almost all of 
which lobby the Legislature.” Paul Carrier, Contributions 
Give Special Interests Political ‘Box Seats, Maine Sunday 
Telegram, Jan. 3, 1999, at 1A. One column declared, 
“There is nothing illegal about tobacco companies 
bankrolling political campaigns--only suspicious. We can 
debate the influence of campaign contributions till the cows 
come home, but one fact remains: The money is given on 
the expectation that it will influence policy.” Editorial, 
Taking the Money, Maine Times, May 15, 1997. This 
sentiment has been oft-repeated: “A group with a certain 
point of view can buy influence during a political campaign 
with a campaign donation. Politicians routinely deny that 
influence is being bought; evidence is often to the 
contrary.” Editorial, A Stain- Guard for State Government, 
Lewiston Sun-J., May 7, 1997. 
 
*       *      *   
 
The fundraising practices of Maine legislators have drawn 
much criticism. One article reported negatively on a 
fundraising breakfast that an organization hosted for 
legislators who served on a committee handling bills 
affecting the organization, emphasizing the absence of 
average citizens. See Bill Nemitz, Dough Rises for Political 
Pancakes, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 8, 1996, at 1B. 
                                                          
15 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391-392 (2000); Daggett v. Comm’n on 
Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 457 (1st Cir. 2000); State v. Alaska Civil 
Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Ak. 1999); State v. Dodd, 561 So.2d 263, 266-267 (Fl. 1990). 
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Another questioned the propriety of an industry hosting a 
fundraiser for a legislator the day before a hearing on an 
important bill affecting the industry. See Editorial, Gravel 
Industry Didn’t Expect Anything for Lord Fund-Raiser?, 
Portland Press Herald, Mar. 26, 1996, at 6A. An editorial 
criticizing such fundraisers commented, “The whiff of too-
close connections between influential lawmakers and 
interests with big money on the line added an acrid aroma 
to legislating in both the House and the Senate this 
session.” Nancy Grape, Let’s Change the Pockets Instead 
of Pocketing the Change, Portland Press Herald, Apr. 7, 
1996, at 5C.16
 
Editorials and opinion pieces swim alongside news reports of shady deals and influence 
peddling in the briefs and opinions that seek to use this type of evidence to demonstrate 
an appearance of corruption.  The editorials signify that someone is perceiving 
corruption:  namely, the editorial boards.  The journalistic accounts serve to imply, if not 
directly prove, that campaign contributors often get privileged access and influence. 
The Supreme Court gave its blessing to the use of journalistic accounts in Nixon 
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.17  There the Court held, quite importantly for our 
purposes, that the amount of proof required to demonstrate corruption or its appearance 
will “vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”18  In 
other words, because the notion that campaign contributors have significant, if not 
“undue”, influence hardly represents new thinking or improbable logic, the evidence 
required to show such a relationship may only need to pass the laugh test.  Among other 
pieces of evidence discussed later, the defendants in Nixon pointed to a newspaper 
editorial discussing the state treasurer’s receipt of a $20,000 campaign contribution from 
a bank, which he decided to use for the state’s official business, and to an article 
                                                          
16 Daggett, 205 F. 3d at 457. 
17 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391, 392 (2000). 
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discussing large contributions from a brewery and bank to a candidate for state auditor. 
Although editorials and journalist’s accounts do not persuade every court,19 after Nixon, 
if not before, defenders of campaign finance reform would do well to pad their briefs 
with such easy-to-find vignettes from the newspapers. 
If the newspapers are found wanting, however, defendants can turn to the 
sponsors of a campaign finance bill or other politicians to submit their own testimony as 
to the appearance of corruption.  This type of evidence appeared to be the most 
significant for the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC, which quotes extensively from 
testimony submitted by former and sitting Senators.20  In Nixon, the Court credited an 
affidavit of a state senator who merely said, “large contributions have ‘the real potential 
to buy votes.’”21  Of course, such testimony is only one species of testimony by experts, 
contributors and others involved in the campaign finance system, who attest to the power, 
access and influence contributors enjoy.  Indeed, an entire book has been published of the 
expert reports submitted in McConnell.22  Political scientists, party officials, campaign 
consultants, contributors, and politicians (both current and former) submitted affidavits 
attesting to the undue influence of large contributions on the political process.  As with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 528 U.S. at 392. 
19 See, e.g., Florida v. Dodd, 561 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1990) (despite journalist accounts that showed a “crisis of 
confidence” in state government, court struck down ban on contributions during legislative session); Ariz. 
Right to Life v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1010 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding submitted newspaper articles 
insufficient as proof of appearance of corruption justifying regulation of PACs); Democratic Party of the 
U.S. v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 578 F.Supp. 797, 830 (E.D.P.A. 1983), aff’d in 
part sub nom, FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (applying “reasonable person standard in evaluating 
whether press reports can give rise to a belief that corruption exists,” rejecting some stories as hearsay, and 
ultimately striking down the law as not justified by corruption interest); Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 
(8th Cir. 1998) (finding that public’s views of corruption were not “objectively reasonable” and pointing to 
newspaper op ed of one legislator explaining why his vote on a tobacco bill was based on substance, not the 
contributions he received from the tobacco industry). 
20 See McConnell v. FEC, 520 U.S. at __, slip op. at 36-42 (quoting testimony of Senators Warren Rudman, 
John McCain, Alan Simpson, and Paul Simon). 
21 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 392.  
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newspaper stories, defendants offer such testimony to support claims of actual corruption, 
or of the affiant’s or public’s perception of corruption. 
Referendum results and public opinion polls serve principally to demonstrate that 
the public, rather than the witness submitting the results of the poll, sees a corruption 
problem and supports the given solution.    Although the Court in Nixon was quick to 
point out that “majority votes do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections,” it 
found the referendum vote on the campaign finance restriction there significant.  “[T]he 
statewide vote . . . certainly attested to the perception relied upon here: ‘[A]n 
overwhelming 74 percent of the voters of Missouri determined that contribution limits are 
necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof.’”23  Of course, support for a 
campaign finance reform proposal does not necessarily mean the public perceives 
corruption or that the interest behind the law is constitutionally legitimate:  some might 
support reforms because of a feeling that they will equalize the playing field, give 
government officials more time to dedicate to official business, or reduce the number of 
negative attack ads.  Nevertheless, widespread public support for reform as expressed 
through direct democracy, especially if the campaign surrounding the initiative focused 
on the corrupting potential of contributions, can serve as one indicator of public 
perception of corruption.24
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 See INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS, 285-296 
(Anthony Corrado et al., eds., 2003). 
23 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 392 (quoting Carver v. Nixon, 882 F.Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo.), rev’d, 72 F. 3d 633 
(8th Cir. 1995)).  
24 See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 458  (“[W]e take note, as did the Court in Shrink Missouri PAC, of the fact that 
Maine voters approved the referendum imposing reduced contribution limits as indicative of their 
perception of corruption.”); Alaska v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 602 (Alaska 1999) 
(noting that 30,000 people signed the petition for a proposed campaign finance ballot initiative and 
crediting a former state house member who personally gathered signatures for the initiative testified that a 
“constant refrain” of citizens was that “the Legislature was owned by special interests”). 
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We spend much of the next Part examining public opinion polls concerning 
corruption and campaign finance so only a brief discussion is warranted here.  Suffice it 
to say that public opinion polls have become a regular part of the state’s offer of proof of 
the appearance of corruption in campaign finance cases.  In Daggett, the court noted that 
70 percent of survey respondents “believed that large campaign contributions were a 
major source of political corruption” and that new limits on contributions would bolster 
faith in the democratic process.25  In Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, the court 
accepted polls showing that 78 percent of Montana voters think money is “synonymous 
with power” and that 69 percent of Montanans believe elected officials give “special 
treatment” to large contributors.26  In Homans v. Albuquerque, the District Court, while 
striking down spending limits as unconstitutional under Buckley, accepted a public 
opinion poll of city voters who believed that federal elections, which had no spending 
limits, were more susceptible to special interest influence than local elections, which 
were governed by spending limits.27  And in the District Court in McConnell, Judge 
Kollar-Kottelly’s opinion provided a near-catalogue of the public opinion data offered by 
the defendants with respect to the overwhelming majorities who view soft money 
contributors as having undue influence.28   
Courts have differed as to whether such polls by themselves prove an appearance 
of corruption29 or save an otherwise unconstitutional law.30  However, such polls attempt 
                                                          
25 205 F.3d at 457. 
26 343 F.3d at 1093. 
27  217 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1201-02 (D.N.M. 2002). 
28 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kottelly, J.).  
29Some courts will delve into the survey design and results to determine whether they actually demonstrate 
a public perception of corruption.  See, e.g., NCPAC, 578 F.Supp. 797, 825-826 (picking apart poll that 
attempted to prove PAC spending gave rise to an appearance of corruption); Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. Pauly, 63 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017-18 (D.C. Minn. 1999) (rejecting survey concerning party expenditures 
and perception of corruption as self-serving and flawed); Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 529-32 (6th Cir. 
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to provide concrete evidence as to whether the Supreme Court’s concerns in Buckley 
regarding the erosion of public confidence in government may have come to fruition.   
The other types of evidence entail an observation by elites (judges, journalists, 
politicians, experts) as to whether the campaign finance regime appears corrupt.  The 
public opinion polls likewise attest to how the system appears, but they also have the 
potential to add information as to how many people perceive corruption and whether 
second order effects of this apparent corruption (widespread alienation, lack of 
confidence, distrust etc.) have emerged.  With that said, one point of this Article is to 
make the argument that such polls do not actually tap into the second order effects that 
form the justification for the Supreme Court’s inclusion of “appearances” as a unique 
state interest here.  Moreover, we argue that an individual’s perception of corruption 
often has little to do with events in the campaign finance system. 
 
C. What is the emphasis on appearances really about? 
Even if few measurable deleterious consequences result from negative public 
opinion about government, however, most would prefer a political state of affairs in 
which citizens do not consider their government corrupt.  Nor do we doubt the 
importance – in an abstract, philosophical or even practical sense – of public opinion 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1998) (rejecting relevance of poll showing that 56% of respondents believed spending limits in judicial 
elections would be helpful in limiting the influence of contributions). 
30 See, e.g., Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 28 F. Supp.2d at 598 (mentioning poll but 
finding segregated fund requirement for corporate initiative spending unconstitutional);  Kruse v. 
Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911, 918 (6th Cir. 1998) (striking down expenditure limit despite poll finding “an 
overwhelming majority of residents believe that large contributors wield undue influence on the political 
system as a whole; that ordinary voters are unable to participate on equal footing in the process; that 
wealthy candidates unfairly drown out candidates with fewer resources; that the high costs of elections 
discourage qualified individuals from running for office, which deprives voters of a full choice of 
candidates; and that overall, money is undermining the fairness and integrity of the political system and 
causing them to lose faith in the democratic process.”). 
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about whether government is being properly influenced.  However, the unique position of 
appearance of corruption in the campaign finance jurisprudence has more to do with the 
difficulties of proving actual corruption, we think, than the importance of the state 
interest in combating such negative perceptions. 
Were the Supreme Court to exorcise the “appearance of corruption” state interest 
from the campaign finance jurisprudence, few campaign finance regulations would pass 
constitutional scrutiny.  Anti-reformists might greet this development with cheers, but 
without the fallback on appearances and perceptions, defenders of campaign finance 
reforms would be left with the difficult job of proving (1) campaign contributions have 
actually corrupted representatives, and (2) that anti-bribery laws are insufficient to 
combat actual corruption.  The existence of the fallback state interest of preventing 
appearances allows judges to say that while they think examples of actual corruption 
justify the given reform, in any event the existence of widespread appearances of 
corruption removes all doubt. 
Proving actual corruption is very difficult.  Few systematic empirical studies of 
campaign finance have arrived at any firm conclusions demonstrating that campaign 
finance contributions or expenditures lead to concrete examples of policy changes.31  
This difficult empirical problem arises, in part, from the nature of the counterfactual that 
needs to be proven:  to demonstrate that campaign finance contributions affect policy 
outcomes, one must know what the policy outcomes would have been in the absence of a 
                                                          
31 See Donald Green, The Need for Federal Regulation of State Party Activity, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS 51 (Anthony Corrado et al., eds., 2003); 
FRANK SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 169 (1992); Richard Hall & Frank Wayman, Buying Time: 
Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797 
(1990); D. MAGLEBY & C. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE 78 (1990).  But see Bradley Smith, Money Talks: 
Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 Geo. L.J. 45, 58 (1997); Bradley Smith, Faulty 
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given contribution.  In other words, representatives can always say that they would have 
voted for a bill anyway, even if supporters of the bill had not contributed large sums to 
their campaigns.  Moreover, contributors can always say that they direct their money 
toward the election of politicians who already support their causes, not toward politicians 
whose minds they hope to change.  Very few smoking guns exist in the campaign finance 
world—that is, examples where a politician publicly declares a position at time t, receives 
a contribution at time t + 1, and then changes his position at time t + 2. 
Take, for example, the Mark Rich pardon scandal.  No one doubts that Mark 
Rich’s wife gave considerable amounts of money to the Democratic Party and the 
election campaigns of President Clinton.  However, how can one disprove the argument 
made by President Clinton that the pardon was based on the merits of the case rather than 
the influence of the campaign contributions?  Of course, the question could be settled by 
discovery of a letter from Louise Rich to President Clinton that said: “I will give X 
number of dollars to your campaign and the Democratic Party, if you grant a pardon to 
my ex-husband.”  But such letters are almost never written and even more rarely 
discovered.32  In any event, such quid pro quos are tantamount to bribes and prohibited 
by the criminal law irrespective of the campaign finance nature of the gift.33
                                                                                                                                                                             
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1067-
1068 (1995). 
32 But see Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003), which cited a letter 
stating the following: 
Please destroy this letter after reading. Why? Because the Life 
Underwriters Association in Montana is one of the larger Political 
Action Committees in the state, and I don't want the demos to know 
about it! In the last election they gave $8000 to state candidates.... Of 
this $8,000--Republicans got $7000--you probably got something from 
them. This bill is important to the underwriters and I have been able to 
keep the contributions coming our way. In 1983, the PAC will be 
$15,000. Let’s keep it in our camp. 
 
33 See 18 U.S.C. §  201 (2003). 
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Examples of such activity present an appearance of impropriety, however, even if 
they do not dispositively prove actual corruption.  The reasonable observer would think 
that official decisions in line with the desires of campaign contributors arise because of, 
rather than in spite of, their campaign contributions.  Emphasizing appearances does not 
implicitly exonerate the recipient or the “system” from a charge of actual corruption or 
undue influence.  Rather, such an emphasis admits the difficulty of proof and relies on an 
assumed consensus that certain correlated events are often causally related.  The 
challenge in proving appearances, then, is to substantiate, through polling data or 
otherwise, the assertion that such a consensus exists.   
Emphasis on appearances becomes controversial, however, when such a 
consensus is irrational or the product of systematic biases.  As demonstrated in the next 
section, if the relevant evidentiary question with respect to appearances is whether a 
contribution at some level gives the contributor more political influence than a similarly 
situated non-contributor, then campaign contributions themselves of whatever size can be 
said to give rise to an appearance of corruption.  Put differently, the move from actual 
corruption to appearances does not rid the analysis of the slipperiness of the concept of 
corruption.34  If campaign contributors (at any level of giving) appear to have more 
influence than non-contributors, then the relevant question becomes whether the apparent 
increase in their influence because of their contribution is “undue.” 
 
II. The Link Between Campaign Finance and Corruption in the Public Mind  
                                                          
34 For a discussion of the malleability of the concept of corruption in campaign finance law, see Thomas F. 
Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMM. 127 (1997); Bruce E. 
Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. L. FOR. 111; Samuel Issacharoff 
& Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999). 
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Although this Article, in large part, criticizes the use of polls to prove public 
perception of corruption, one must admit that such perceptions are widespread and that 
most Americans view campaign contributions and expenditures as corrupting.  Indeed, as 
the data presented in this Part suggest, if the only constitutional barrier to enacting 
campaign finance reform of any sort is public recognition that campaign contributions or 
expenditures corrupt, then all campaign finance reform is constitutional.  We present the 
data from McConnell v. FEC here because the poll conducted for the case uses the most 
recent data, but comparable polls in other campaign finance cases would provide nearly 
identical results. 
 We should note at the outset the disjuncture between public opinion and the 
jurisprudence on campaign finance.  One should not be surprised to learn that the nuances 
in the caselaw escape most respondents to public opinion surveys concerning campaign 
finance.  Unlike the Supreme Court, for example, the public does not make a distinction 
between campaign expenditures and contributions: Both are seen as corrupting or leading 
to undue influence.  Nor can one find in public opinion the Court’s fine distinctions 
among various political actors with respect to their potential for corruption.  Although 
public attitudes toward corporations are routinely less favorable than toward other actors 
in the political system, the public does not distinguish between contributions from 
corporate treasuries, for example, and those from corporate PACs.  Indeed, few 
respondents probably know exactly what a PAC is. 
 Whereas public opinion may not reflect the Court’s nuanced treatment of certain 
campaign finance questions, the sources of confusion in the caselaw cause similar 
confusion when placed in a public opinion survey.   Thus, a word like “corruption,” 
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which has bedeviled the various Justices who have struggled with Buckley and its 
progeny, also may evoke different definitions and attitudes from survey respondents who 
are confronted with it.  Therefore, surveys attempt to measure “corruption” or “undue 
influence” in different ways – sometimes using the buzzwords familiar to the caselaw, 
and other times trying to get at similar or related concepts such as political efficacy, or 
trust in government. 
 Despite these shortcomings and qualifications, however, it is clear from the 
available survey data that a large majority of Americans believe that campaign 
contributors exert substantial influence over office holders.  As part of its defense of the 
BCRA in McConnell v. FEC, the Department of Justice submitted an expert report from 
Columbia Political Scientist Robert Shapiro, who canvassed hundreds of polls from news 
organizations, polling firms, and foundations to present findings concerning public 
opinion related to corruption and campaign finance reform.35  DOJ also commissioned its 
own survey from two polling firms, The Mellman Group and Wirthlin Worldwide, Inc., 
which conducted a telephone poll of 1300 Americans.36  The pollsters asked a variety of 
questions concerning the influence of donations to political parties. 
 The first question, and perhaps the point of departure for the Mellman-Wirthlin 
poll, was:  “How much impact do you think big contributions to political parties have on 
decisions made by the federal government in Washington, D.C.? . . . a great deal of 
impact, some, not too much, or none at all, or don’t you have an opinion on this?”  The 
responses were as follows: 
                                                          
35 See Robert Shapiro, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance, Sept. 18, 2002 (declaration submitted for the 
defendants in McConnell v. FEC) (unpublished, on file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review).   
Many of the polls referenced in the footnotes to this Article come from the wonderful compilation provided 
in the Appendix to Shapiro’s report. 
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55% Great deal 
23% Some 
5%   Not too much 
1%   None at all 
16% Don’t have an opinion37
 
The survey evoked similar patterns of response for several questions attempting to tap the 
perceptions of campaign contributors’ influence.  For example, 68% of respondents 
agreed that “big contributors sometimes block decisions by the federal government in 
Washington, D.C. that could improve people’s everyday lives.”  And 84% agreed (51% 
strongly and 33% somewhat) that “Members of Congress will be more likely to listen to 
those who give money to their political party in response to solicitations for large 
donations.”38
 The survey also included a battery of questions specifically tailored to the 
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.  Interviewers asked: “If an 
individual, issue group, corporation, or labor union donated $50,000 or more to the 
political party of a Member of Congress, how likely would a Member of Congress be to 
give the contributor’s opinion special consideration because of the contribution?” 
41% Very likely  
41% Somewhat likely 
6%   Somewhat unlikely 
3%   Very unlikely39
 
The survey garnered similar responses when the question was rephrased to substitute 
“paid for $50,000 or more of political ads on the radio or TV that benefited a Member of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
36 Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin, Research Findings of a Telephone Study Among 1300 Adult 
Americans, Sept. 23, 2002 (unpublished, on file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
37 Id., at 6. 
38 Id., at 8. 
39 Id., at 9. 
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Congress” in place of “donated $50,000 or more to the political party of a Member of 
Congress.”40
 To rebut these findings, the plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of the 
BCRA commissioned their own study from Q. Whitfield Ayres.41  He did not dispute the 
results, per se, of the Mellman-Wirthlin survey—that is, he did not disagree that many 
Americans believe “big” contributors to political parties gain influence over legislators.  
Rather, he proved that the same patterns of response arose when one substituted the hard 
money limits allowed by the BCRA for the soft money limits prohibited by them.  In 
other words, he found that an overwhelming majority of Americans considered a $25,000 
individual contribution to a party (allowed by the BCRA) to be a “big” contribution that 
could influence the vote or opinions of a Member of Congress.  These results supported 
the conclusion, he argued, that the BCRA “will not reduce the appearance of corruption 
in American politics.”42
 There are some important distinctions between the surveys submitted by the 
opposing sides in McConnell v. FEC.  For example, the plaintiffs’ survey only asked 
about contributions by individuals and did not include questions about corporations and 
unions.  (The Mellman and Withlin study, as mentioned above, combined individuals, 
issue groups, corporations and unions for several questions.)  However, the point of the 
plaintiffs’ rebuttal survey was to demonstrate that the same proportion of Americans 
consider activity the BCRA permits as posing the same corruption threat as activity the 
BCRA prohibits.  So while it may be the case that a large majority of Americans view the 
                                                          
40 Id., at 10. 
41 See Rebuttal Declaration of Q. Whitfield Ayres, McConnell v. FEC, Oct. 7, 2002 (on file with University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
42 Id., at 8. 
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current system as allowing corruption, they will continue to do so even in the world of 
the new reforms. 
To reframe the controversy between the McConnell experts in the language of 
constitutional law:  the state may have demonstrated the existence of a compelling 
interest, but it failed to show the chosen means were narrowly tailored to address that 
interest.  For purposes of adjudicating the constitutionality of the BCRA, though, these 
arguments may pass each other like ships in the night.  The Court has emphasized that 
campaign reforms need not be “scalpel-like” in their precision when they seek to further 
the state interests in combating corruption or its appearance.43  Perhaps Americans 
believe that contributions both beyond and within the limits of the BCRA threaten to 
corrupt parties and candidates.  The failure of Congress to set lower limits, however, can 
hardly be used to condemn the rationale justifying the implementation of a less restrictive 
law.  Indeed, by this logic, Congress could not ban billion dollar contributions so long as 
the public was equally disturbed by million dollar contributions. 
Below the surface of this debate concerning the BCRA’s underinclusiveness 
lurked a more serious criticism as to the nature of mass opinion concerning the influence 
of campaign contributors.  The problem with respect to perceptions of corruption may not 
be one of degree—in other words, that Congress has failed to set limits low enough to 
address people’s corruption fears.  Rather, it might arise from a difference in kind—that 
people register objections to campaign contributions, but their underlying concern is that 
some groups/institutions/individuals simply have more influence than others do.  
Additional survey evidence sheds light on this quandary.  Between 1998 and 2002, three 
Gallup polls asked the following question seeking to tap people’s resignation to special 
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interest influence:  “Some people say major changes in the laws governing campaign 
finance could succeed in reducing the power of special interests in Washington.  Other 
people say no matter what new laws are passed special interests will always find a way to 
maintain their power in Washington.  Which comes closer to your point of view?”  The 
results appear in Table A.  
 
Table A. Results from Gallup Poll Asking Whether Campaign Finance Reform 
Could Succeed in Reducing Special Interest Influence. 
 
 Major changes 
could succeed 
in reducing 
power 
Special 
interests will 
maintain 
power 
 
 
 
Neither/Other 
 
 
No  
opinion 
2002 Feb 8-10 28% 67% 1% 4% 
2000 Oct 6-9 28% 64% 2% 6% 
1998 Mar 20-22 31% 63% 2% 4% 
  
About two-thirds of Americans consistently believe that “special interests” will maintain 
their power regardless of campaign finance regulation.44  Of course, this resignation to 
special interest influence even in the face of more restrictive campaign finance laws does 
not dampen enthusiasm for reform (indeed, any reform).  Between sixty-five and seventy-
five percent of Americans consistently favor new laws governing campaign finance, with 
forty percent saying such laws would be good for democracy, thirty-six percent saying 
                                                                                                                                                                             
43 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391-392 (2000). 
44 Polls that do not include the option of “special interests will maintain their power” reveal substantial 
majorities that say campaign finance reform will be effective at reducing special interest influence.  For 
example, the ABC News-Washington Post Poll has asked: “Do you think stricter campaign finance laws 
would reduce the influence of money in politics, or not? [If yes, ask:] Would it reduce it a lot or a just 
somewhat?” 25% say such laws will reduce it a lot, 38% say somewhat, 33% say it will not, and 4% have 
no opinion.  See Shapiro, supra, at Appendix. 
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they would not make much difference, and thirteen percent saying they would be bad for 
democracy.45
 A mixed picture thus emerges from the campaign finance-specific polls that have 
been conducted.  No one can dispute that the public perceives a great deal of corruption 
and undue influence arising from campaign contributions.   Large majorities of 
Americans view campaign contributors as exercising undue influence over public policy 
and the decision making of officeholders.  They favor all forms of campaign finance 
reform and believe such reforms would make government work better.  However, equally 
large majorities believe that contributions within the limits of the BCRA will give their 
contributors undue influence, and more importantly, that special interests will maintain 
their power regardless of new restrictions on campaign finance.  Thus, for a court 
adjudicating a challenge to a campaign finance regulation, ample evidence exists to 
suggest that private contributions and independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate 
appear corrupt in the mind of a substantial majority of Americans.  In other words, if we 
take the state interest requirement of Buckley to mean that the state need only prove that 
an appearance of corruption exists and the population perceives it, then polls indicate 
such an interest would probably be satisfied for almost any restriction on contributions or 
expenditures. 
The strongest counterargument to the reform position is not that the public fails to 
perceive corruption or that the state has no interest in combating those appearances.  
Rather, opponents of reform can point to evidence suggesting that these perceptions of 
undue influence are largely independent of anything occurring in the campaign finance 
system.  Thus, campaign finance reform is unlikely to prevent erosion of “confidence in 
                                                          
45 See Gallup Poll at http://www.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1585. 
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the system of representative Government.”46  This argument, as mentioned above, 
undermines reformist claims of solvency or amelioration – in other words, “tailoring” of 
the means to effectuate the state interest.  The question still remains, though, if 
perceptions of corruption are detached from events and regulations in the campaign 
finance system, from where do these perceptions come?  Why do some people view 
government officials as corrupt and how can we explain these shifts in aggregate public 
opinion over time? 
 
III. Explaining and Measuring Public Attitudes of Corruption  
Corruption is a word that means different things to different people.  Indeed, 
different definitions of corruption in the campaign finance caselaw since Buckley have 
come from different Justices and even different Court majorities.  Corruption can refer to 
quid pro quo arrangements, “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment,”47 and even 
“the corrosive and distorting effect of [corporate] wealth”48 on the electoral system more 
generally.  In public opinion, the notion of corruption is at least as multifaceted or open to 
different interpretations as it is for judges who hear campaign finance cases.  As a result, 
measuring feelings of corruption may be as rich (or pointless) an enterprise as measuring 
people’s “happiness,” “optimism” or “satisfaction.” 
While recognizing the difficulties in defining corruption and measuring attitudes 
of corruption, we should not thereby assume that nothing meaningful can be said about 
why some people view government as corrupt and why larger shares of the population 
                                                          
46  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
47 Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) 
(Colorado Republican II). 
48 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
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hold these views at particular times.  Interesting and sometimes unexpected patterns 
emerge – patterns that may be relevant to the campaign finance debate, in the event 
courts want to take seriously the question whether certain reforms will have measurable 
effects on aggregate public opinion about government. 
 
A. How to Measure Attitudes of Corruption 
The National Election Study has included three questions in its survey that come 
close to tapping public opinion about corruption in government.  None of these questions 
actually use the word corruption, but this difference in wording may allow for more 
specific conclusions as to trends in particular attitudes or components of the vague 
concept of corruption.  These three questions attempt to measure trust in government, 
crookedness of people running the government, and influence of big interests: 
Distrust: People have different ideas about the government 
in Washington.  These ideas don’t refer to Democrats or 
Republicans in particular, but just to government in 
general. We want to see how you feel about these ideas.  
How much of the time do you think you can trust the 
government in Washington to do what is right – just about 
always, most of the time or only some of the time? 
 
Crooked:  Do you think that quite a few of the people 
running the government are crooked, not very many are, or 
do you think hardly any of them are crooked? 
 
Special Interests: Would you say the government is pretty 
much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves 
or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?49
 
Figure 1 depicts the trends in responses to these questions from 1958 to 2002.  For 
the “crooked” question, the line represents those respondents who say “quite a few of the 
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people running the government are crooked.”  For the “distrust” question, the line 
represents the percent of respondents who say they can trust government only some of the 
time.  Although the questions may attempt to tap different attitudes, the lines rise and fall 
together, for the most part.  As more people distrust government, more people also view 
government officials as crooked and more people see government as run by a few big 
interests.  To be sure, levels of distrust of government “to do what is right” may reflect a 
lack of confidence in government efficiency or ability to solve any problems.  And 
beliefs in the crookedness of government officials may have more to do with government 
lying or Watergate-style nefariousness than with bribery or undue influence by particular 
groups.  And respondents who see government as “pretty much run by a few big 
interests” may hold that belief because the alternative – “for the benefit of all” – seems 
unrealistic and utopian.   
With these caveats in mind, we can nevertheless see that public opinion measured 
by these questions has shifted significantly over time and certain historical events or 
trends appear to explain these shifts. The percent of Americans who distrust government 
most of the time has varied from a low of about 24% in 1958 to a high of 75% in 1994.  
The percent who see government as run by a few big interests has varied from a low of 
31% in 1964 to 76% in 1994.  The percent of Americans who think “quite a few people 
running the government are crooked” has varied from a low of 25% in 1958 to a high of 
51% in 1994.  All three measures of public attitudes of corruption rose in the late Sixties 
and early Seventies, dropped between 1980 and 1984, rose relatively steadily between 
1984 and 1994, and have been dropping ever since. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
49 See National Election Studies, 2002 Questionnaire, available at 
ftp://ftp.nes.isr.umich.edu/ftp/nes/studypages/2002prepost/2002prepost_qnaire_post.htm 
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B. Explaining Trends in Public Perception of Corruption  
Some seat-of-the-pants explanations for these trends jump out from the data.  
With the Vietnam War, civil rights struggle and general tumult of the late Sixties, it is 
unsurprising to see a jump in the share of people with low regard for government 
according to these measures.  The steep climb at the time of Watergate is dramatic and 
also unsurprising.  Afterwards, the trend plateaus or even recedes a bit during the early 
years of the Carter administration, but with stagflation and the Iran hostage crisis in 1980 
came a rise in the lines to the highest point until that time.  The economic recovery during 
the first Reagan years correlated with a decline in feelings of distrust, crookedness, and 
undue special interest influence, but such feelings began to ascend once again during the 
Iran-Contra affair and through the first two years of the first Bush administration.  
Feelings of distrust and crookedness drop briefly during the time of the first Iraq war, but 
they reach their highest point two years into the Clinton administration at the time of the 
1994 Republican Revolution.  However, they have been dropping steadily ever since.50   
Indeed, as Figure 2 points out, this steady decline has occurred despite the 
explosion of soft money over the same period.  The share of the population registering 
feelings of distrust and special interest influence declined thirty points, from seventy-
seven percent in 1994 to forty-six percent in 2002, and the percent of the population 
believing quite a few government officials were crooked declined from 51 percent in 
1994 to 28 percent in 2002.  Over the same period, soft money contributions went up 
fivefold – from about one hundred million dollars to over five hundred million dollars.  
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Of course, there is some parlor-trickiness to this graph – one set of lines is expressed as 
percentages, while the other is expressed in dollars, and all types of contributions always 
increase over time.  However, the graph still drives home the point:  the share of the 
population perceiving corruption went down even as soft money skyrocketed. 
 
C. Who Sees Corruption?:  The Demographic, Political and Attitudinal 
Correlates to Perception of Corruption 
Arguments as to why aggregate opinion has shifted over time do not necessarily 
help explain why some individuals are more likely than others to perceive government as 
corrupt.  However, in many respects, this may be the more interesting and answerable 
question:  Why are some types of people more likely to say that “quite a few people 
running the government are crooked” or that “government is pretty much run by a few 
big interests looking out for themselves”?  (We do not analyze distrust because others 
have ably done so and we think the question fails to tap the particular issue of undue 
influence that frames the campaign finance debate.51) 
We begin several hypotheses that we hope will explain some of the variation 
among people in their responses to these questions.  The unifying argument behind these 
hypotheses is the following:  Respondents who are unhappy with their position in society, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
50 The most recent Pew Center study of trust in government makes many of these arguments.  See Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, Deconstructing Distrust: How Americans View Government 
(1997), available at  http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=95. 
51 See David Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality, 7 THE 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW 207-219 (Fall 2002); Jack Citrin, Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in 
Government, 68 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 973-88 (1974); Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, David C. King 
eds., Why People Don't Trust Government (1997); John P. Robinson ed., MEASURES OF POLITICAL 
ATTITUDES (1999); Pippa Norris ed., CRITICAL CITIZENS: GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENT (1999); Jack Citrin & Donald Green, Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of 
Political Trust, 16 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 431-53 (1986).  For an excellent review of the literature on trust in 
government, see Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI 
475 (2000). 
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with the incumbents who run the government, or with government or people in general 
are more likely to deem government corrupt.  Expressions of anti-government feeling – 
that those running the government are crooked or unduly influenced – are rooted in 
multiple sources of personal and political dissatisfaction.   For the most part, these 
sources of dissatisfaction are either intractable or reactive to macro-political trends, such 
as the state of the economy or the party of the incumbent president.  We categorize these 
sources of dissatisfaction into three rough groupings:  demography (race, income, 
education, age), opinions as to the current state of affairs (presidential approval, opinion 
of the economy), and social-psychological predispositions (opinions concerning big 
business, government waste, tax rate fairness, and interpersonal trust). 
The first hypothesis might be described as the “out-group” hypothesis:  We expect 
individuals of lower socio-economic status and individuals who feel that the political 
system has given them a raw deal to blame government, in part, for their position, and 
therefore, deem it corrupt.  Naturally, we would expect those groups with less political 
power to be somewhat more “anti-government” than those with power, and these feelings 
of powerlessness translate into expressions of opinion that those running the government 
are crooked or unduly influenced by a few big interests.   
Derived from the respondent’s opinions as to the current state of affairs, the 
second hypothesis might be described as the “sour grapes” hypothesis:  we expect to find 
that those unhappy with incumbent performance or with the state of the economy will 
express their dissatisfaction by deeming government corrupt.  The psychological 
mechanism for this dissatisfaction is similar to that for “out-groups,” though naturally 
these opinions change more easily than does one’s socioeconomic position, age or race.  
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We expect those with a low approval rating of the incumbent President and those 
unhappy with the direction of the country more generally, such as those who view the 
economy as worsening over the previous year, to express their dissatisfaction by 
describing those running the government as crooked or unduly influenced by a few big 
interests. 
The third hypothesis, the “libertarian-populist” hypothesis, suggests that 
individuals who are suspicious of government, in general, tend to believe that the 
government, at any given time, is corrupt.  We try to tap into these political 
predispositions by analyzing opinions concerning government waste, tax rate fairness and 
big business.  We expect to find that some people are simply against “big government” 
and believe that government is almost by nature corrupt.  Unlike the previous set of 
variables, these opinions, we surmise, are more recalcitrant to change.  In other words, 
some people will believe government is corrupt no matter how well government 
performs.  Such respondents adhere to the belief that all politicians are crooks, no matter 
which crooks happen to be in power at the time or whether they are doing a good job or 
not.   
Finally, we test whether those who view government as corrupt also view people 
as corrupt.  If true, this adds some support to a “cynicism hypothesis”: people who are 
naturally mistrusting of others will be more likely to mistrust government and call it 
corrupt.  By analyzing questions that tap interpersonal trust, we examine the contention 
that cynics who inevitably question people’s motives or regard people as generally selfish 
may be more likely to view government as crooked or unduly influenced by a few 
interests.  Just as some people may be of the opinion that all politicians are crooks, some 
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may believe that most people are crooked.  Therefore, perception of government 
corruption is merely one manifestation of a cynical worldview that people, in general, 
cannot be trusted to act in public spirited or other-regarding ways. 
For defenders of current reform efforts we may be leaving out the most important 
potential explanation for perceptions of corruption.  After all, the “good government” 
hypothesis suggests that some phenomenon in the political system – either in the form of 
apparent undue influence of campaign contributors or perhaps outright bribery – 
translates into public perception of corruption.  We set forth the alternative hypotheses 
here, however, to chip away at the good government hypothesis:  They offer a different 
source for people’s beliefs in government corruption.  That said, we should reiterate that 
nothing in the graphs or regressions that follow undermines the basic conclusion of the 
polls discussed earlier in this Article.  We do not disprove the contention that Americans 
view politicians as corrupted by campaign contributions or that Americans view the 
campaign finance system as “corrupt.”  Rather, we suggest that Americans’ “confidence 
in the system of representative government”52 – specifically, their beliefs that government 
officials are not “crooked” and that government is “run for the benefit of all” – is related 
to their position in society, their general tendency to trust others, their philosophy as to 
what government should do, and their ideological or philosophical disagreement with the 
policies of those in charge.   
We present graphs here that are most illustrative of our argument.  We alternate 
between graphs for the “crooked” question and the “few interests” question while noting 
in the text instances where the same relationship does not exist for both questions.  We 
have provided in the Appendix multivariate analyses for all the variables discussed here 
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for both the “crooked” and “special interest” questions.   For the most part, the models for 
the two questions are similar.  We have presented the regressions in two formats in the 
Appendix:  first, as a model derived from the entire NES dataset since 1964 with dummy 
variables for statistically significant years, and second, as separate regressions for each 
year in the survey.    
 
1. The Demography of Corruption Attitudes  
If the “out-group” hypothesis is true, then we should expect individuals of certain 
demographic characteristics to be more likely than others to express the view that 
government is corrupt.  When we break down the survey universe according to race, 
income, education, and age, we find some support for this contention.  With respect to 
race, we find that African Americans are more likely than whites to believe government 
officials are crooked and, all else equal, to view government as run by a few big interests.  
Figure 3, which breaks down the crooked question according to race, shows that the 
racial difference was most pronounced during the Nixon and Ford administrations.  In 
1972, before the Watergate scandal, the difference was the greatest with 65% of African 
Americans, but only 35% of Whites, deeming government officials crooked.  (The trends 
are not as stark for the few interests question.)  Since then, a larger share of the African 
American population has consistently viewed government officials as crooked, but the 
difference has shrunk to almost nothing in recent years.  As displayed in the Appendix, in 
multivariate analysis of the combined NES dataset for all years where the questions were 
asked, race is statistically significant, but that may be due largely to the gap between 
blacks and whites in the early years.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
52  424 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
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Education, however, is a relatively strong predictor of people’s perception of 
crookedness and (to a lesser degree) undue influence.  The share of college graduates 
who view government officials as crooked is consistently lower than the share of non-
college graduates.  The difference was the greatest in 1996 when 57% of those without a 
college education viewed government officials as crooked, while only 34% of college 
grads responded as such, as Figure 4 depicts.  The difference is less stark, once again, for 
the “few interests” question, but for both questions education is significant when placed 
in the regression for the entire NES dataset. 
A similar pattern emerges with respect to income.  As Figure 5 demonstrates, a 
smaller share of the richest third of Americans has consistently claimed government was 
crooked and the same pattern holds for the few interests question.  The lines on the 
graphs indicate the respondent’s income percentile.  The line at the bottom of the graphs 
– indicating a lower share who believe government is crooked or run by a few interests – 
for most of the history of the question represents the top 5 percentiles of income. 
Age appears to be a bit trickier.  For some reason, age is significant in regressions 
for both questions but the signs go in opposite directions.  In other words, the older you 
are, the less likely you are to view government as crooked, but the more likely you are to 
view government as run by a few interests.  We found the same pattern for cohort groups: 
earlier generations are less likely than more recent generations to view government as 
crooked, but more likely to view it as run by a few interests.  It may be that earlier 
cohorts are less likely to cast an aspersion at government officials by calling them 
“crooked” – a word that some might even view as unpatriotic – but are more likely to 
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have resigned themselves to the reality that government will be controlled by a few 
interests. 
In any event, there seems to be some support for the “outgroup” hypothesis: 
African-Americans, the poor, and the less educated are more likely to view government 
as corrupt.  There is no reason to believe that these groups are more likely to observe 
corruption or have information unavailable to other groups.  Rather, as groups with less 
influence, they naturally view those with power to be improperly influenced by members 
of the in-groups.  By deeming government corrupt, their survey responses express their 
dissatisfaction with political leaders, the government, and how it is run.   
 
2. The Politics of Corruption Attitudes 
Although we find some support for the outgroup hypothesis, a person’s political 
attitudes is often a more powerful predictor of whether they view government as corrupt.  
Consistent with the theme that those who lose in the political process would deem the 
victors corrupt, we would expect political opponents of those in power to view 
government as corrupt.  We find some support for the “sour grapes” hypothesis in the 
data when we examine the correlation between perceptions of corruption and 
respondents’ partisanship, opinion of the sitting President, and opinion concerning the 
performance of the economy over the previous year. 
Opinion of the sitting president is one of the best predictors of perceptions of 
corruption.  As Figure 6 illustrates, those who disapprove of the way the President is 
handling his job are more likely than those who approve to view government as corrupt.  
The variable remains significant in multivariate analysis as well, although as the 
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Appendix indicates the NES survey only began including the presidential approval 
question in 1972.  We should make clear one point that is obscured by these graphs and 
several of the others in this subsection:  the lines do not take into account the relative 
sizes of the populations who approve and who disapprove of the way the President is 
handling his job.  In other words, a doubling of the number of people who disapprove of 
the president will not be revealed on these graphs; the graphs only indicate the share of 
“approvers” or “disapprovers” that believe government is crooked or run by a few big 
interests.  Nevertheless, the consistent trend is clear:  those who approve of the president 
are less likely to consider government as crooked or run by a few big interests.  The gap 
was greatest on the crooked question in 1972:  57% of those who disapproved of the 
President considered government officials crooked, while only 31% of those who 
approved of the President registered the same response.  While it has never reached that 
great a disparity since 1972, there is a consistent ten-point difference on the “crooked” 
question between those who approve and those who disapprove of the job the president is 
doing.  As Figure 6 depicts, the difference between “approvers” and “disapprovers” on 
the “few interests” question is even more stark.  In 1972, 1984 and 2002 – elections in 
which the incumbent Republican President was incredibly popular but disliked by his 
opponents – the margins between those who disapproved and those who approved of the 
President were 33, 28 and 26 percentage points respectively.   
Of course, it is possible that respondents disapprove of the president’s job 
performance precisely because they believe he is crooked or beholden to a few big 
interests.  Even if the causal arrow moves in that direction, however, we learn from these 
graphs how views of the President, individually, affect questions about government 
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corruption generally.  Keep in mind, the questions ask whether “quite a few people 
running the government . . . are crooked” and whether “government is pretty much run by 
a few special interests.”  Even if all we learn from these graphs is that opinion of the 
President shapes one’s views concerning government corruption more generally, then we 
have still learned that public perception of corruption may be unrelated to the sum total of 
corruption in government more generally (for example, in the Congress or in the states).  
Yet we think a better and more complete explanation for this relationship exists, one that 
is consistent with the other data already presented:  People who disapprove of the 
President vent their disapproval by calling government corrupt.  Their feeling that the 
President might be unduly influenced by particular groups or even bribed is not the 
source of their unhappiness.  Rather, they register their dissatisfaction with the President 
by painting government with a broad brush, labeling it with any negative descriptor 
offered to them. 
Given that dissatisfaction with the incumbent President appears to correlate with 
perceptions of corruption, we might also expect partisanship to factor into an individual’s 
assessment of government corruption.  After all, if the sour grapes hypothesis is true, then 
Democrats should view the government as corrupt when Republicans control the country 
and vice versa.  We find some support for this contention.  As the regressions in the 
Appendix make clear, membership in the party of the sitting President is negatively 
correlated with attitudes concerning government corruption.  Unsurprisingly, a 
President’s fellow partisans are less likely to view government as corrupt under his 
watch, but because partisanship is so highly correlated with (and subsumed by) 
presidential approval, it drops out for most of the regressions by years.  For the special 
 38
interest question, Figure 7 depicts the attitudes of self-identified “strong” Republicans 
and Democrats and “pure” Independents, although the indicated trends are similar, if not 
as dramatic, for party identification on a three point scale (Democrats, Republicans or 
Independents).  During the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and G.W. Bush 
administrations, a greater percentage of Democrats than Republicans considered quite a 
few government officials crooked and government as run by a few big interests.  
Whereas, during the Carter and Clinton administrations, a greater share of Republicans 
than Democrats viewed government officials as corrupt and government as run by a few 
big interests. While the strongest partisans (that is, those who identify themselves as 
Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans) usually differ in their perceptions of 
corruption according to expectations, the strength of Party ID is not directly related to 
one’s propensity to perceive corruption.  In other words, as one gets more Republican – 
moving from Strong Democrat to Weak Democrat to Independent Democrat to Pure 
Independent to Independent Republican to Weak Republican to Strong Republican – one 
does not necessarily become more likely to perceive corruption in government while a 
Democratic president is running the country.  In the 1990s, for example, sometimes the 
share of Independents who view government as corrupt is greater than the share of 
Democrats or Republicans who view government as corrupt.  From this, one might 
expect that strength of Party ID has some relationship to perceptions of corruption:  in 
other words, perhaps partisans feel a greater stake in the system and therefore are less 
likely to malign it with charges of corruption, while independents are alienated and more 
likely to charge any party controlling the government with corruption.  However, we did 
not find any support for this hypothesis when party strength was added to the regressions.   
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To add credence to this theory that perception of corruption may have little to do 
with perceptions of undue influence and more to do with dissatisfaction with the state of 
the world, we can examine the results of a question that does not mention government at 
all.  Since 1980, the NES survey has asked people to evaluate the performance of the 
economy over the previous year: has it gotten better, gotten worse, or remained the same?  
Consistently, those who view the economy as having gotten worse are more likely to 
consider government corrupt according to both questions, even though, as in recent years, 
the margin is sometimes not terribly great.  (See Figure 8.)  Why might this be?  Well, the 
good government hypothesizers might suggest that those who view the economy 
unfavorably attribute it to government corruption, but that idea seems implausible.  
Rather, the more likely explanation is that those who are unhappy with the performance 
of the economy sometimes vent their displeasure and displace their anger onto the 
government, deeming officials crooked or as unduly influenced.  In 1990, for example, 
79 percent of those who viewed the economy as having gotten worse over the previous 
year said government is run by a few big interests, whereas only 52 percent of those who 
viewed the economy as having gotten better voiced the same response.  In other years, 
however, the gap is much smaller, perhaps because performance of the economy was not 
a particularly salient or divisive issue, although the order of the lines from top to bottom 
maintains the same pattern.   
Presidential approval, partisanship, and opinions on economic performance are 
correlated with each other, but the relationship of each of these variables to our 
dependent variables supports the argument that perspectives on incumbents translate into 
attitudes about government corruption.  In other words, we tend to see corruption in those 
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whom we are predisposed to dislike or oppose, and when we are displeased with the 
current state of affairs, we tend to lash out by saying government is corrupt.  Like the out-
group hypothesis, the sour-grapes hypothesis is predicated on a notion that individuals 
translate a generalized negative affect toward the “system” into a particularized 
expression describing government as corrupt.  Authentic political disagreements, let 
alone intractable feelings about one’s political opponents, are not the kinds of attitudes 
that campaign finance reform, or even any government policy, is likely to counteract.   
 
3. Attitudes Toward “Big Government” and Perception of Corruption 
Thus far, we have found some support for the notion that those who have lost out 
in the political system, either historically or temporarily, are more likely to view 
government as corrupt.  Yet the libertarian-populist hypothesis suggests that something 
more than victimization or sour grapes explains Americans’ perception of government 
corruption.  For some, government, almost by definition, may be corrupt, and the 
“bigger” government gets the more corrupt it becomes. 
Unfortunately, the NES survey does not have a battery of questions that test this 
hypothesis.  One question that suggests some support for this idea is:  “Do you think that 
people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t 
waste very much of it?”  As Figure 9 suggests, views of government waste correlate 
strongly with perceptions of corruption.  (Indeed, this variable is the most predictive of 
all that we analyzed.)  40 to 60 percent of those who think government wastes a lot of 
money we pay in taxes answer that quite a few people running the government are 
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crooked, while only ten to thirty percent of those who see little waste answer similarly.   
A similar twenty to thirty percentage point gap exists for the “few interests” question. 
A series of recent questions on taxation provides additional evidence that feelings 
about government, in general, correlate with perceptions of corruption, in particular.  The 
2002 NES Survey asked respondents whether they paid too much, too little or just the 
right amount in taxes.  It also asked respondents for their opinion as to whether the rich 
and the poor paid too much, too little or just the right amount in taxes.  As Table B below 
demonstrates, consistent with the libertarian-populist hypothesis, respondents who 
believe they pay “more than they should” in taxes are more likely to believe that quite a 
few people running the government are crooked and that government is run by a few big 
interests.   35.4 percent of those who say they pay more than they should in taxes believe 
that quite a few people running the government are crooked, whereas only 19.6 percent of 
those who think they pay the right amount say quite a few are crooked.  The findings are 
similar for the few interests questions: 58.1 percent of those who say they pay too much 
in taxes, but only 43.6 percent of those who say they pay the right amount, respond that 
government is run by a few big interests. 
 
Table B. Opinion on Tax Rate Fairness and Perception of Corruption 
 Percent responding that “Quite a 
Few People Running the 
Government are Crooked”  
(N) 
Percent responding that 
“Government is run by a few big 
interests looking out for 
themselves” 
 (N) 
Respondent pays more than s/he 
should 
35.4 (211) 58.1 (334) 
Respondent pays just the right 
amount in taxes 
19.6 (133) 43.6 (286) 
Respondent pays less than s/he 
should 
48.6 (17) 50.0 (16) 
The rich pay more than they 28.5 (51) 45.8 (76) 
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should 
The rich pay just the right amount 20.0 (92) 42.1 (185) 
The rich pay less than they should 32.4 (215) 58.1 (379) 
The poor pay more than they 
should 
33.3 (185) 60.1 (325) 
The poor pay just the right 
amount 
21.1 (134) 42.3 (257) 
The poor pay less than they 
should  
35.1 (34) 48.5 (47) 
 
These feelings concerning tax policy are not limited to one’s perception of one’s 
own tax rate, however.  Those who believe the rich pay too little in taxes or the poor pay 
too much are also more likely to view government as corrupt according to the two 
measures.  32.4 percent of those who say the rich pay less than they should in taxes, as 
compared to 20.0 percent of those who say the rich pay just the right amount, say quite a 
few people running the government are crooked.  58.1 percent of those who say the rich 
pay less than they should in taxes, as compared to 42.1 percent of those who say the rich 
pay just the right amount, say government is run by a few big interests.  In other words, 
those who believe the rich are not paying their fair share are somewhat more likely to 
believe that government is crooked or run by a few big interests.  In contrast, those who 
see the poor as paying more than they should in taxes are more likely to view government 
as corrupt.  33.3 percent of those who say the poor pay more than they should believe 
quite a few government officials are crooked, as compared to 21.1 percent of those who 
say the poor pay the right amount.  The difference is similar for the “few interests” 
question: 60.1 percent as compared to 42.3 percent 
Of course, adherents to the good government hypothesis might offer the 
explanation that respondents view corruption as causing government waste.  In other 
words, campaign contributors, lobbyists or bribers may exact concessions from the 
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government in the form of wasteful, pork barrel spending.  A corrupt government, under 
this view, naturally wastes money as it pays off those who unduly influence it.  For 
similar reasons one might expect attitudes toward taxation to be correlated with 
perceptions of corruption:  Respondents may think their taxes and the taxes of the poor 
are too high especially because those tax dollars go to a corrupt government.  Likewise, 
under this view, respondents may perceive the rich as paying too little in taxes precisely 
because they have successfully (and unduly) influenced government to get lower tax 
rates.  We cannot disprove these alternative, complicated explanations;  all we can say is 
that our findings are consistent with a theory that posits that a person’s perception of 
government corruption often correlates with one’s feelings as to how government raises 
and spends its money. 
The libertarian populist might not only be suspicious of government, but of other 
large and powerful institutions, as well.  We find, for example, that respondents’ opinion 
about big business also correlates with their responses to the questions attempting to tap 
governmental corruption.  Those who consider quite a few government officials corrupt 
or view government as run by a few big interests give a lower feeling thermometer rating 
to “big business.” (The feeling thermometer question asks respondents how warm they 
feel toward a particular group with 100 being the warmest and most favorable and 0 
being the coldest and least favorable.)  Figure 10 separates respondents according to their 
feeling thermometer rating of big business.  Those who feel warmly toward big business 
are less likely to view government as corrupt.  The differences in the 2002 survey are 
dramatic.  For example, only 20.5 percent of those who give a feeling thermometer rating 
for big business between 76 and 100 degrees view government as run by a few big 
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interests, whereas 72. percent of those who give big business a rating between 0 and 25 
believe government is run by a few big interests.  Similar results are found for the 
crookedness question.  Perhaps those who see government as corrupt do so because they 
fear power more generally.  However, in fairness to the good government hypothesizer, 
respondents who believe big business is bribing the government will probably have a low 
opinion of both government and big business. 
As a piece of final support for the hypothesis that one’s political philosophy 
affects specific opinions about government corruption, we have included in the aggregate 
regressions by individual years found in the Appendix feeling thermometer ratings for 
“the poor” and “people on welfare”.  The magnitude of the effect of these variables is 
slight, though often statistically significant.  The fascinating result from these two 
variables, however, is that “warm” feelings toward the “poor” and warm feelings toward 
“people on welfare” correlate differently with attitudes of corruption.  The warmer 
respondents feel toward the poor, the more likely they are to perceive government as 
corrupt.  However, the warmer they feel toward people on welfare, the less likely they are 
to view government as corrupt.  How can we explain this?  On the one hand, those who 
support or express positive feelings toward an out-group (that is, the poor) tend to view 
government as corrupt.  On the other, when respondents are primed to think about the 
poor in terms of a government program or subsidy (that is, as people on welfare), the 
libertarian-populist streak presents itself and those voters who are in favor of such big 
government programs view government as less corrupt, but those who are against welfare 
view government as more corrupt.  Again, the magnitude of the effect is tiny, but the 
differences between the two variables add credence to our theory that attitudes about 
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government corruption can be a function of one’s feelings about “big government,” as 
opposed to undue influence. 
 
4. Distrust of Government as a Species of Interpersonal Distrust 
That fear and distrust of government translate into perceptions of corruption is 
less surprising than the correlation between distrust of people and such perceptions.  If 
we can demonstrate that those who believe people are corrupt also tend to view 
government as corrupt, then we have come a long way toward an explanation that 
perceptions of government corruption arise more from the predispositions of the 
perceiver than from what exactly he or she is perceiving.  Moreover, if perceptions of 
government corruption have such deep psychological roots, then changes in 
governmental policy are unlikely to have much of an effect on people who are almost 
hard-wired to see the worst in others, including those running the government. 
In selected years the NES has asked questions attempting to tap respondents’ 
perception of the trustworthiness of other people.  We find a strong and consistent 
relationship – as presented in Table C for the 2002 survey and in the regressions in the 
Appendix for selected years – between individuals’ response to these questions 
concerning interpersonal trust and the likelihood that an individual will believe quite a 
few people running the government are crooked or that government is run by a few big 
interests.  The three NES questions appear below, followed by Table C, which presents 
the 2002 data: 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? 
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2. Would you say that most of the time people try to 
be helpful, or that they are just looking out for 
themselves? 
 
3. Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got the chance or would 
they try to be fair? 
 
Table C. Trust in People and Perception of Government Corruption (2002) 
 Percent responding that  
“Quite a Few People Running the 
Government are Crooked”  
(N) 
Percent responding that 
“Government is run by a few big 
interests looking out for 
themselves” (N) 
“Most people can be trusted” 19.4 (142) 46.0 (323) 
“Can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people” 
37.7 (219) 56.5 (320) 
 
“Most of the time people try to be 
helpful” 
 
21.0 (100) 
 
43.8 (204) 
“They are mostly looking out for 
themselves” 
 
50.5 (94) 
 
65.2 (118) 
 
“Most people would try to be 
Fair” 
 
20.4 (101) 
 
49.6 (234) 
“Most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a 
chance” 
79.6 (393) 57.8 (89) 
 
As with Table B, here we compare the propensity of cynics and noncynics to 
respond that government is corrupt.  For each question we find that the percentage of 
cynics who view government as corrupt is greater than the percentage of noncynics who 
view government as corrupt.  For example, only 19.4 percent of those who say “most 
people can be trusted” believe quite a few people running the government are crooked, 
while 37.7 percent of those who say that “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people” 
believe quite a few people running the government are crooked – an eighteen point gap.  
Similar relationships exist for the few interests question.  43.8 percent of those who say 
“most of the time people try to be helpful” believe that government is run by a few big 
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interests, whereas only 65.2 percent of those who say people “are just looking out for 
themselves” believe government is run by a few big interests – a twenty-one point gap.   
As the regressions in the appendices depict, one of the most consistent and 
reliable predictors of respondents’ propensity to answer “crooked” and “few interests” is 
their answer to the question:  “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of 
you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?”  Someone who answers that 
“most people would try to take advantage of you” is twice as likely as one who says 
“they would try to be fair” to say that “quite a few people running the government are 
crooked” or “government is run by a few big interests.”  This relationship is as true today 
as it was when the question was first asked in the 1960s.  Respondents who are 
suspicious of other people’s motives, who tend to see the worst in people and who view 
others as selfish, are more likely to think that government also is a repository of greedy, 
self-interested forces. 
Even more than opinions about the proper place of government in people’s lives, 
these feelings of interpersonal mistrust are not the types of attitudes that government 
policy, let alone policy surrounding campaign finance, is likely to change.  Put simply, if 
you are a trusting person, you also tend to trust government.  Restricting the sources and 
amounts of campaign contributions will not change one’s basic psychological 
predispositions that feed into one’s perspective on whether those running the government 
are crooked. 
 
D. Trust in Government in Comparative Perspective 
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By examining the shared characteristics of the groups of people who perceive 
corruption we hope to have cast some doubt on the popular (and perhaps legal) notion 
that such perceptions relate to activity in the campaign finance system.  One other 
method we could use to see if something distinct in the American political system is 
fostering these perceptions is to compare American public opinion with that of other 
countries.  If levels of public perception of corruption were comparable between the 
United States and other countries with more restrictive campaign finance regimes, then 
we would have an additional piece of evidence casting doubt on the importance of the 
campaign finance system in shaping public opinion about their government. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a cross-national poll that specifically measures corruption, 
but the Eurobarometer poll of 15 European countries has asked a question concerning 
trust in government similar to that asked in the NES poll: “Do you tend to trust or tend 
not to trust your national government?”  When we compare the cross-national data, we 
find that the United States does not do too well, but that several other countries, with very 
different campaign finance regimes, have populations equally distrustful of their 
government. 
As Figures 11 and 12 illustrate, comfortable majorities in several countries say 
they “tend not to trust their government.”  In at least one of the polls over the last eight 
years, a majority in thirteen of the sixteen countries said they tend not to trust the 
government, and in nine countries, a majority, on average, tends not to trust the 
government.  Seventy-one percent of Italians in 1996 and Belgians in 1999 mistrusted 
their government – the highest percentages in any country throughout the last seven 
years.  The United States, the United Kingdom and Germany come closely behind in 
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1996, when sixty-eight, sixty-three, and sixty-one percent, respectively, distrusted their 
government.  On average over this time period, 57.50 percent of Americans distrusted 
their government, placing us just behind Italy (59.25 percent) and alongside Belgium and 
the United Kingdom (57.00 percent).  As of 2003, however, the United States ranked 
thirteenth out of sixteen countries in the share of its population that distrusted the 
government: only Finland, Denmark and Luxembourg had populations that trusted their 
government more.  In short, Americans are quite distrustful of their government, but we 
are not alone. 
We do not mean to overstate the significance of this comparative analysis.  
Idiosyncratic factors, such as the Belgian pedophilia scandal in 1999 or cultural 
differences that might make respondents less likely to say they distrust their government, 
may explain much of the differences between countries.  Moreover, as suggested earlier 
when we omitted the trust-in-government question from our analysis of the NES data, we 
do not believe this question is the most relevant when it comes to evaluating perceptions 
of corruption or undue influence, per se.  And, in any event, we agree that the relatively 
high average level of Americans’ distrust should be a cause for concern.   
With all those caveats, the fact still remains that countries with very different 
political systems, most of which have public funding of elections, nevertheless have large 
sections of their population that distrust their government.  For those who would turn to 
campaign finance reform to restore Americans’ trust in government, these cross-national 
data suggest their efforts might not produce the anticipated results.  And while we can 
always aspire to achieving the status of Luxembourg or Finland, purging the American 
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mind of its unique fear of big government (let alone making American society similarly 
tiny and homogeneous) may be more than any government program could achieve.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
 We began this Article with an assessment and an explanation of the Supreme 
Court’s unique emphasis on the appearance of corruption in campaign finance cases.  
This exception to the general First Amendment rules we think arises less from a genuine 
fear of the implications of such bad appearances for democratic values than from an 
admission that proving actual corruption is very difficult.  With that said, we have real 
concerns about the misuse of public opinion polls to prove public perception of 
corruption.  
 There can be no doubt that the American people perceive the campaign finance 
system as corrupt and, in large numbers, will support almost any restriction on 
expenditures and contributions.  While believing that campaign contributions corrupt 
parties and candidates and that campaign finance reform is desirable, a majority of 
Americans also agree that special interests will continue to have undue influence even 
once such reforms are passed.  Moreover, available survey data suggest that Americans’ 
perceptions of corruption are less related to phenomena occurring in the campaign 
finance system or public policy more generally, than they are to Americans’ views about 
their position in society, the incumbents in office or their attitudes about how government 
ought to tax and spend.   
We find some support for several hypotheses that undermine the theory that 
improper influences on government generate Americans’ perceptions of corruption.  
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First, we found some support for the hypothesis that certain “out groups”, such as African 
Americans, the poor, and the less educated are more likely to believe government is 
corrupt.  Second, we found some support for the hypothesis that those who disapprove of 
the job the president is doing, who believe the economy has gotten worse, or who belong 
to a political party different than the President are more likely to believe that government 
is corrupt.  We also found some support for a libertarian-populist hypothesis: people who 
simply dislike government are more likely to believe it is corrupt, as evidenced by the 
relationship between opinions of government waste and taxes and perceptions of 
corruption.  Finally, perception of government corruption may be a subspecies of a 
broader psychological phenomenon, distrust of people in general.  Cynics who are 
predisposed to seeing the worst in people also tend to see the worst in government. 
 In the end, we must admit that large shares of the American population distrust 
their government and believe the campaign finance system is a source of undue influence.  
However, as surveys from other countries indicate, Americans are not alone in their 
distrust of government, and countries with radically different campaign finance regimes 
also have populations registering a high level of government distrust.  For those who 
would look to campaign finance reform to restore “confidence in the system of 
representative government,”53 they may be disappointed by the intractability and 
psychological roots of that lack of confidence. 
                                                          
53  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
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Figure 1 - Trends in Public Opinion of Government (1958-2002)
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Figure 2 - The Rise of Soft Money and the Drop in Perception of Corruption (1992-2000)
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Figure 3 - Race and Perceptions of "Crookedness" of Government (1958-2002)
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Figure 4 - Education and Perceptions of "Crookedness" of Government (1958-2002)
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Figure 5 - Income and Perceptions of "Crookedness" of Government (1958-2002)
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* Line designates income percentile of respondent.
Figure 6 - Presidential Job Approval and Perceptions of Special Interest Influence 
(1972-2002)*
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* Question asks respondents if they approve or dissaprove of the way that <name> is handling his job as President.
 
 55
Figure 7 - Extreme Partisanship and Perceptions of Special Interest Influence
(1964-2002)
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Figure 8 - Evaluation of the Performance of the Economy over the Previous Year and 
Perceptions of Special Interest Influence (1980-2002)*
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* Question asks respondents if over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse.
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Figure 9 - Perceptions of Waste of Tax Money and Perceptions of Special Interest Influence 
(1964-2002)*
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*  Question asks respondents if people in the government waste a lot of money paid in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste 
very much of it.
Figure 10 - Perceptions of Big Business and Perceptions of Special Interest Influence
(1964-2002)*
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*  Line refers to respondents rating of big business on a feeling thermometer (0=cool; 100=warm).
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Figure 11 - Distrust of Government in Comparative Perspective (1996, 1999, 2001, 2003)*
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*  Eurobarometer asks respondents if they tend to trust or tend not to trust their national government while the U.S. question (asked by the NES in 1996, 1998, 
2000, and 2002) asks respondents "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right – just about always, 
most of the time or only some of the time?"  The graph depicts the percent in the Eurobarometer survey that say "they tend not to trust" and the percent in the 
NES survey that say they trust "only some of the time."
 
Figure 12 - Distrust of Government in Comparitive Perspective (average 
1996,1999,2001,2003)*
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 APPENDIX
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Appendix A. Coefficients for Logistic Regression Model of the Log Odds of Believing Quite a Few in Government are Crooked  
Race     1.550*** 1.487*** 1.315*** 1.148
Income     
     
     
   
   
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    
0.821*** 0.828*** 0.821*** 1.092
Education 0.628*** 0.600*** 0.649*** 0.642***
Age 0.904*** 0.889*** 0.826*** 0.676***
Presidential 
Disapproval (not included) 1.484*** 1.208*** 
1.201 
Member of 
President’s Party 0.787*** 0.929 0.930
1.082 
Government Wastes 
Tax  Money 4.516*** 4.260*** 4.208***
4.626*** 
Economy Last Year (not included) (not included) 1.092*** 1.052 
People Would Take 
Advantage of you  
 
(not included) (not included) (not included) 0.466*** 
1964 (Omitted) --- --- ---
1968 0.675*** --- --- ---
1970 0.779** --- --- ---
1972 1.018 --- --- ---
1974 1.349*** (Omitted) --- ---
1976 1.200* 1.006 --- ---
1978 1.092 0.888 --- ---
1980 1.443*** 1.116 (Omitted) ---
1984 0.861 0.733*** 0.764* ---
1988 1.354*** 1.120 1.030 ---
1990 1.756*** 1.539*** 1.368*** ---
1992 1.627*** 1.275*** 1.145 ---
1994 1.925*** 1.547*** 1.682*** ---
1996 1.733*** 1.480*** 1.468*** (omitted)
1998 1.411*** 1.232* 1.260 0.820
2000 1.211* 1.038 1.064 0.744*
Constant 0.179*** 0.134*** 0.186*** 1.519
N 22960 16944 7817 1865
* p <0.05.  ** p <0.01.  *** p <0.001 
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Appendix B. Coefficients for Logistic Regression Models of the Log Odds of Believing Quite a Few in Government are Crooked by Year 
      Race Income Education Age Presidential Disapproval 
Member 
Pres’s 
Party 
Gov’t 
Wastes 
Tax 
Econ 
Last 
Year 
Big 
Business 
Therm 
Poor 
Therm 
Welfare 
Therm 
Can’t be 
too 
careful 
People 
Take 
Advantage 
Constant N
1964                0.542* 0.878 0.807 0.946 --- 0.780 5.527*** --- 0.890 --- --- 0.770 0.445*** 3.286* 1212
1968                0.731 1.233 0.648 0.908 --- 0.923 5.374*** --- 0.969 --- --- 0.427*** 0.567*** 1.935 1150
1970 2.521*** 0.783            0.704 0.905 --- 0.655** 3.968*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.095 1357
1972               2.037*** 1.069 0.864 1.200* +++ 0.648*** 3.148*** --- 0.816** 0.933 --- 0.605*** 0.482*** 1.218 1785
1974               1.039 0.898 0.633* 0.994 1.743*** 1.018 3.573*** --- 0.786** 1.112 --- 0.531*** 0.553*** 1.067 979
1976                2.198** 1.021 0.547** 1.041 1.404* 1.089 3.945*** --- 0.883 1.172 0.960 0.510*** 0.572*** 0.387 1260
1978               1.578* 0.706** 0.508*** 0.967 1.739*** 0.904 4.299*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.082*** 1577
1980                1.308 0.937 0.508*** 0.821* 1.453** 0.873 3.753*** 0.671 0.876 +++ +++ --- --- 0.498 1149
1984            1.378 0.904 0.678* 0.852 0.990 0.792 4.501*** 1.105* 0.976 1.301* 0.778* --- --- 0.128*** 930
1988               1.462 0.496*** 0.704 0.941 1.152 1.087 3.335*** 1.183*** 1.059 1.102 0.684** --- --- 0.210* 617
1990 1.624* 0.635*** 0.647**            0.993 1.423* 0.948 4.223*** 1.101 --- 1.207* 0.878 --- --- 0.084*** 1123
1992             1.058 0.890 0.919 0.976 0.890 0.842 3.844*** 1.238** 0.846* 1.185 0.848 0.593*** --- 0.480 1288
1994               1.284 0.924 0.867 0.722** 1.190 1.014 4.728*** 1.110* 0.879 1.474*** 0.766** --- --- 0.244* 820
1996                2.149** 0.880 0.614* 0.695** 1.330 0.945 3.718*** 1.051 0.650*** 1.045 0.736* 0.697 0.599* 4.932* 648
1998                0.573 1.177 0.730 0.694** 1.062 1.081 6.198*** 1.080 --- 1.197 --- 0.733 0.583* 1.348 605
2000                1.322 1.518 0.669 0.626*** 1.215 1.405 4.552*** 1.004 0.926 1.342* 0.875 1.120 0.412*** 0.670 582
2002            0.742 0.735 1.203 0.762 1.123 0.949 2.981*** 0.356 0.982** 1.007 0.999 0.813*** 0.769*** 2.603 354
      * p <0.05.  ** p <0.01.  *** p <0.001 
      --- indicates question was not asked in that particular year       
     +++ indicates sample size is too small for analysis 
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     Appendix C. Coefficients for Logistic Regression Model of the Log Odds of Believing Government is Run by a Few Big Interests  
Race     1.148** 1.019 1.029 0.753
Income     
     
     
    
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    
0.780*** 0.824*** 0.844** 0.803
Education 0.904* 0.882** 0.932 0.931
Age 1.105*** 1.069** 1.106** 1.034
Presidential 
Disapproval (not included) 2.229*** 2.015*** 1.242 
Member of 
President’s Party 0.630*** 0.815*** 0.909 1.031
Government Wastes 
Tax  Money 4.389*** 4.184*** 4.000*** 3.573***
Economy Last Year (not included) (not included) 1.112*** 1.070* 
People Would Take 
Advantage of you (not included) (not included) (not included) 0.517*** 
1966 (Omitted) --- --- ---
1968 1.443*** --- --- ---
1970 1.912*** --- --- ---
1972 2.343*** --- --- ---
1974 4.242*** (Omitted) --- ---
1976 4.271*** 1.339*** --- ---
1978 4.680*** 1.435*** --- ---
1980 5.191*** 1.392*** (Omitted) ---
1982 3.760*** 1.142 0.973 ---
1984 2.402*** 0.761*** 0.651*** ---
1988 3.937*** 1.220* 0.960 ---
1990 5.764*** 1.884*** 1.482*** ---
1992 7.833*** 2.159*** 1.570*** ---
1994 6.943*** 2.059*** 1.799*** ---
1996 5.817*** 1.904*** 1.822*** (omitted)
1998 4.438*** 1.500*** 1.430** 0.802
2000 3.995*** 1.301** 1.201 0.716*
Constant 0.196*** 0.240*** 0.212*** 3.700**
N 23137 17377 8408 1817
* p <0.05.  ** p <0.01.  *** p <0.001 
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Appendix D. Coefficients for Logistic Regression Models of the Log Odds of Believing the Government is Run by a Few Big Interests By Year 
      Race Income Education Age Presidential Approval 
Member 
Pres’s 
Party 
Gov’t 
Wastes 
Tax 
Econ 
Last 
Year 
Big 
Business 
Therm 
Poor 
Therm 
Welfare 
Therm 
Can’t be 
too 
careful 
People 
Take 
Advantage 
Constant N
1964               0.887 0.729 1.139 1.280* --- 0.561*** 4.712*** --- 0.741*** --- --- 0.687* 0.373*** 3.772* 1160
1966              0.439*** 0.805 0.898 1.345** --- 0.515*** --- --- 0.886 --- --- 0.363*** --- 7.220*** 1016
1968                0.487** 0.895 0.870 1.218* --- 0.686** 3.738*** --- 0.677*** --- --- 0.505*** 0.646** 10.414*** 1092
1970               1.500 0.577*** 1.089 1.327*** --- 0.555*** 4.549*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.208*** 1277
1972           1.239 0.822 0.946 1.189* +++ 0.734* 3.941*** --- 0.688*** 1.017 --- 0.606*** 0.520*** 5.729*** 1699
1974                0.988 0.834 1.439 1.307* 2.512*** 1.041 4.315*** --- 0.608*** 1.022 --- 0.407*** 0.651* 3.806 935
1976                0.881 1.064 0.963 1.188 2.815*** 0.697* 3.214*** --- 0.604*** 1.024 0.872 0.594** 0.576** 6.580** 1196
1978                0.751 0.739* 0.987 1.020 2.080*** 0.860 5.419*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.481* 1532
1980                0.754 0.848 0.581* 1.231* 2.358*** 1.066 3.803*** 1.177 0.680*** +++ +++ --- --- 0.461 964
1982                0.954 0.902 0.925 0.877 2.726*** 0.815 3.556*** 1.047 --- --- --- --- --- 0.328* 824
1984                1.068 0.996 1.087 1.040 2.572*** 0.749 3.499*** 1.104 0.865 1.263* 0.891 --- --- 0.105*** 901
1988                1.798 0.561** 1.049 0.972 2.971*** 1.105 4.433*** 1.026 0.684** 1.122 0.888 --- --- 0.278 598
1990               1.036 0.957 1.032 1.580*** 2.242*** 0.823 5.112*** 1.346*** --- 1.178 1.003 --- --- 0.026*** 1094
1992                1.031 0.987 1.378 1.530*** 1.703** 0.756 4.133*** 1.185* 0.833 0.951 0.943 --- --- 0.319 1264
1994                0.935 0.954 0.770 0.908 1.495 0.954 4.619*** 1.132* 0.621*** 1.152 0.798 --- --- 3.400 795
1996           0.542 0.965 0.838 0.845 2.023* 1.096 3.244*** 1.172* 0.565*** 1.497** 0.871 0.794 0.468** 11.665** 635
1998                0.941 0.772 1.052 1.283 1.213 0.979 3.315*** 1.118 --- 1.135 --- 0.964 0.552** 0.893 584
2000                0.768 0.805 0.983 0.955 0.988 0.859 3.788*** 0.949 0.729* 1.144 0.955 1.840** 0.679 2.316 569
2002                0.911 0.953 1.979** 1.102 1.195** 0.956 2.681*** 0.577 0.975*** 1.006 1.002 0.870* 0.807*** 2.079 352
      * p <0.05.  ** p <0.01.  *** p <0.001 
      --- indicates question was not asked in that particular year      +++ indicates sample size is too small for analysis 
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Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance:  When Public Opinion 
Determines Constitutional Law 
By 
Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie 
 
This study tests the empirical assumptions about American public opinion 
found in the Supreme Court’s opinions concerning campaign finance 
reform.  The area of campaign finance is a unique one in First Amendment 
law because the Court has allowed the mere perception of a problem (in 
this case, “corruption”) to justify the curtailment of recognized First 
Amendment rights of speech and association.  Since Buckley v. Valeo, 
defendants in campaign finance cases have proffered various types of 
evidence to support the notion that the public perceives a great deal of 
corruption produced by the campaign finance system. Most recently, in 
McConnell v. FEC, in which the Court upheld the McCain-Feingold 
campaign finance law, both the Department of Justice and the plaintiffs 
conducted and submitted into evidence public opinion polls measuring the 
public’s perception of corruption.  This article examines the data 
presented in that case, but also examines forty years of survey data of 
public attitudes toward corruption in government.  We argue that trends in 
public perception of corruption have little to do with the campaign finance 
system.  The share of the population describing government as corrupt 
went down even as soft money contributions skyrocketed.  Moreover, the 
survey data suggest that an individual’s perception of corruption derives 
from that person’s (1) position in society (race, income, education level); 
(2) opinion of the incumbent President and performance of the economy 
over the previous year; (3) attitudes concerning taxation and “big 
government”; and (4) propensity to trust other people, in general.   
Although we conclude that, indeed, a large majority of Americans believe 
that the campaign finance system contributes to corruption in government, 
the data do not suggest that campaign finance reform will have an effect 
on these attitudes. 
 
